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Art, and Evolution, by Stephen Davies (OUP, 2012) 
Lodewijk Muns 
Funny Ideas 
What art does to us – why, for instance, a certain piece of music may strike us as 
movingly beautiful – can it be explained with the methods of psychology? Ludwig 
Wittgenstein thought not. In fact, he dismissed the idea as ridiculous: 
People often say that aesthetics is a branch of psychology. The idea is that once we are 
more advanced, everything – all the mysteries of Art – will be understood by 
psychological experiments. 
This is very funny – very funny indeed. There doesn’t seem any connection between 
what psychologists do and any judgement about a work of art. 
The sort of explanation one is looking for when one is puzzled by an aesthetic 
impression is not a causal explanation, not one corroborated by experience or by 
statistics as to how people react. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief 
(1967), p. 17, 19-21.  
That aesthetic experiences cannot be exhaustively explained (“all the mysteries of art”) 
may be readily admitted. But why wouldn’t we be able to pinpoint some of the factors 
that cause, say, our perception of beauty and perfection in some work of music? 
Wittgenstein’s outburst may sound even odder if we realize that in its eighteenth 
century (Enlightenment) origin, between roughly 1735 and 1790, aesthetics was 
considered precisely “a branch of psychology” (as is implied by the word aesthetics, 
which relates to perception). 
What maybe explains Wittgenstein’s view is the fact that aesthetic judgment 
(typically: is it beautiful?) is, like moral judgment (is it good or bad?), a matter of choice. 
Choice, but not arbitrary, and not entirely subjective. Exclaiming How beautiful! is not a 
reflex, it is an expression of the decision to credit a specific experience with a certain 
value (about which we may argue). The problem was most famously discussed by 
Immanuel Kant, and it may have been through his (unintended) influence that 
philosophers of aesthetics developed an abhorrence of psychology. 
Nowadays, the sciences of mind are eagerly applied to questions of art and 
aesthetics. There are three main areas of research: the first focuses upon human 
cognition and behaviour; the second upon the possible evolutionary origins of our 
aesthetic behaviours; and the third, the neurological approach, studies what happens in 
our brains when we’re engaged with artworks. The subject is popular enough to foster 
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an industry of bestsellers and would-be bestsellers, particularly in the third (brain) 
division.  
Upgrading Mysteries: How Art Works  
How Art Works: a Psychological Exploration (2019) by psychologist Ellen Winner belongs 
in the first, cognitive-behavioural division. The title alludes, I presume, to Stephen 
Pinker’s How the Mind Works (1997), and, presumably, shares in that author’s irony. As 
Pinker put it, progress in psychology allows at least some baffling “mysteries” to be 
“upgraded to problems” that can be resolved (p. ix). And that implicitly answers 
Wittgenstein’s sceptical outburst. 
Winner is very much aware of the philosophical complexities of the problems she 
has set out to resolve. Accordingly, she starts with the grand question Can Art Be 
Defined? To which she answers: most people, including philosophers, think not. Her 
interest is the question how people (preferably non-experts) behave rather than how, by 
some standard, they should behave. 
Other long-standing conundrums include Does Music Express Emotion to the Listener? 
(“people agree on which basic emotions are expressed by music even in a culturally 
unfamiliar form”, p. 239); Does Music Evoke Emotion in the Listener? (it does, but “the 
emotions we feel from music feel somewhat different from emotions that have objects 
and that are evoked outside of music”, ib.); Are Aesthetic Judgments Based on Anything 
Objective? (perhaps); and Does Art Make Us Smarter? (there is little support for that). 
One instance where aesthetic judgment is challenged by statistics of behaviour is 
the popular prejudice against abstract expressionist painting: “my kid could have made 
that!” (p. 243). As Winner shows in an interesting series of experiments, in about two 
thirds of cases people (non-experts) correctly distinguish an abstract expressionist 
painting from a superficially similar painting by a toddler or a chimp. The main factor 
in this seems to be intentionality: people recognize the work as successfully conveying 
human intention. But, Winner asks, does that mean that the glass is two-thirds full, or 
one-third empty? 
Winner opts for full. But even if the evidence proves that people are mostly able to 
tell the difference between a Jackson Pollock and the work of a toddler or a chimp, 
there still is the disconcerting fact that many museum pieces could be exchanged with 
toddler’s art. (And, contrary to Winner, I think it would be interesting to put experts to 
the same tests.) Anyhow, seeing a difference does not by itself justify abstract 
expressionism’s status as art. All it shows is that a Pollock (along with a Kincade and a 
Bob Ross) carries a stronger intentionality than the work of a toddler. And how many 
people who exclaim that their kid could have made that actually believe what they say? It 
may just be a pointed way of expressing aesthetic disapproval. 
The question of the origins of art and aesthetic practices arises only briefly as a 
conclusion to the chapter on Who Makes Art and Why? 
While art serves many very important psychological functions from culture to culture, 
we cannot say that these functions are why art evolved, or that without art we would 
not have survived. Art making could well just be a product of our complex brains. […] 
Without art, Homo sapiens might have survived but we would be a very different kind 
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of species. (p. 233) 
The question of the evolutionary origin of may not even be a sensible one. As Winner 
acknowledges, “art” is not a natural kind, but a shifting cultural concept (p. 14). What is 
usually ignored is the fact that the concept of “art” is also of fairly recent origin 
(1750-1800). It arose as a generalization only after “the arts” or “the fine arts” in the 
modern sense had acquired encyclopaedic status, as an area of human endeavour 
specifically different from other pursuits such as the sciences. 
The way Winner attempts to answer the question how art works does not depend 
however upon a strong concept of “art”. Her interest is in how people respond to 
various art forms and artworks. And these may have existed in the past without being 
“art”. 
Different Ball Games: The Aesthetic Animal 
Another recent aspiring bestseller from the same publisher (OUP), The Aesthetic Animal 
by the Danish psychologist Henrik Høgh-Olesen, is specifically devoted to the question 
of evolutionary origins. Høgh-Olesen’s intention is to “shine an extensive and 
important light on the big “why” of art and aesthetics” (p. 12). The “big why”, 
predictably, turns around survival and reproduction, and his tools are those of 
behavioural (rather than cognitive) psychology. In this pursuit, “[…] the goal is not to 
steal the ball from the humanities. The goal is to join the match” (p. 75). But, to extend 
the metaphor, it looks a bit like playing rugby on a tennis field. The author shows little 
interest in the game as it has been played by philosophers since antiquity, and 
particularly since the Enlightenment. Consequently, the author seems to have no 
interest in the definition, or definability, of these confusing concepts, “art” and 
“aesthetics”. They are interchangeably interpreted as modes of behaviour (p. 12, 144), 
or as an impulse that is “expressed” (p. 5). 
The vagueness of the “art” concept is harmless in Winner’s book because she is 
interested mainly in specific artistic or aesthetic behaviours. With Høgh-Olesen it 
becomes more problematic because of his assumption that art, in all its variety, can be 
explained by recourse to an “aesthetic impulse”. 
[…] all these forms of art stem from the same basic human impulse, and that is why it 
is this impulse we must understand first. (p. 11) 
An impulse “is a natural, internal behavioral incentive that does not need external 
reward to exist”; it is “an inherent part of human nature, and therefore a primary 
impulse in its own right […].” (p.7) The existence of this impulse is simply assumed. As 
an explanatory device it remains dubiously empty. 
Even though this is a “primary impulse”, there are even more primary impulses or 
forces “behind it” (p. 8). One is what the author calls neophilia (literally, a craving for 
novelty); a second resides in the social hierarchy into which humans organize 
themselves; and a third in the human craving for symbolic meaning. 
Neophilia is not, as in common usage, a personality trait that compels the fortunate 
owner to seek out novelty. It is simply a desire for stimulation, a desire so desperate 
that even unpleasant electric shocks may be preferable to 15 minutes of boredom (p. 
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18). Høgh-Olesen thinks that this sensual, stimulation-seeking aspect of aesthetics has 
been neglected (p. 5). In fact, it is a commonplace since the Abbé Dubos commenced 
his Réflections critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture (1729) with a chapter on “the necessity 
of being occupied in order to avoid boredom” (De la necessité d’être occupé pour fuir l’ennui). 
It remains a mystery to me why different “aesthetic” behaviours should be reduced 
to one impulse. Take just music – it is recognized nowadays that our ability to make 
and enjoy music involves many diverse abilities, that may be involved in different ways 
in highly diverse kinds of music. 
Many inaccuracies in this slim volume (167 p.) raise the suspicion that Oxford 
University Press has hastily produced it for a peak in arts-and-origins interest. A 
prehistoric gravesite in Sungir (Russia) is said to contain an incredible 10.177 
“hand-carved pearls”. A quick internet search reveals that this wealth consists of beads. 
The ideal female waist-to-hip ratio of 0.7 is given in the figure (p. 57) as an absurd 
0.7%. 
An experiment that counts as a classic, An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior, by 
Heider and Simmel (1944) is cited by Høgh-Olesen as an illustration of the fact that 
humans spontaneously construct “a narrative world of stories” (p. 117). The study 
reports on spectators’ interpretations of a short animated cartoon, in which geometrical 
figures perform “a random set of movements without meaning or purpose”, according 
to Høgh-Olesen (p. 117). It will be instantly clear upon watching this movie that the 
movements are far from random, but have been precisely scripted so as to suggest a 
story. In fact, Heider and Simmel do not claim that they are random. Their own version 
of the script outlines precise “situations and activities” (p. 244). If you observe 
something like two men fighting over a woman (p. 248) you’re reconstructing a story 
that was purposefully written into the work. 
Aimed more explicitly than Winner’s book at a popular science readership, the 
book’s “entertaining” writing style approaches that of a script for Discovery Channel, 
and indeed several of its topics have been extensively televised. The colour illustrations 
(mostly stock images from the internet) and coloured chapter separators are merely 
cosmetic, and one image (2.6) is an inferior photocopy. 
Evolving Onward: The Artful Species 
I have argued that our category of art is culturally and historically bounded. This idea 
has been rejected by philosopher Stephen Davies in The Artful Species: Aesthetics, Art, and 
Evolution (2012). Davies extensively discusses the pitfalls that may occur when biological 
evolutionary theory is applied to the phenomena of art, aesthetics and culture. (The 
absence of his work among the references of The Aesthetic Animal is one of that 
book’s omissions).  
Davies agrees with Høgh-Olesen in positing a biological origin of what he calls – 
following a long philosophical tradition – “the aesthetic sense”, a sense for beauty (or 
beauty and its awe inspiring variety, the sublime; p. 10). 
Davies finds it “difficult to embrace the idea that Greek tragedy and the works of 
Michelangelo, da Vinci, and Shakespeare are not art” (p. 25). All that means, however, 
is saying that we, nowadays, are in the habit of calling those works “art”. It is another 
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matter whether Shakespeare or Sophocles, or anybody before 1750, did have that same 
concept, and shared our perspective on culture and human productivity. 
Davies’ concept of art is “generous, far-reaching”, and includes decoration (p. 3). 
But this generosity seems to clash with his own intuitions. Addressing the question 
“What falls under the concept of art?”, he argues that: 
It might be thought that the universality of art follows straightforwardly from the 
observation that all cultures have music, poetry, narrative, drama, dancing, and 
picturing. This argument would be too fast, however, if not all music, poetry, and so on 
should be counted as art. “Happy Birthday” and the catchy jingle that advertises the 
phone number of the local pizza parlor are music, but I’d be reluctant to count them as 
art, even assuming a humble view of what art is. (p. 26-27) 
So, not all music is art, for no stated reason (what’s wrong with Happy Birthday?), but 
origami (folding little paper boats and swans) is (p. 27). 
The question of what is or is not art is of little interest when we’re speaking of 
evolutionary origins. What counts is the cognitive faculties that are involved in our 
various abilities and propensities to create all kinds of things. The reason why Davies 
holds on to those timeless, general categories of art and aesthetics is that he endorses 
the theory of gene-culture coevolution, which allows that “culture can affect what 
adaptations are favored” (p. 230). Borders between history and evolution then become 
somewhat fluid: “evolution is ongoing and not necessarily separable from cultural 
process and change” (p. 149). Even “the form that modern art takes” (p. 134) – such as 
the novel, three centuries old – might be fitted into this evolutionary history. In this 
sense, the artful species is what we’ve only just become. 
